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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann 
§78A-4-103. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Joshua presents what he claims to be nine different issues in his brief to this 
Court. However, Cassie believes there are actually only four issues before this Court. 
One issue is the division of assets and liabilities between the parties; the second is the 
award of some attorney's fees to Cassie following Joshua's contempt; the third is a 
procedural issue concerning the denial of Joshua's Motion to Continue the trial for a 
third time; and Joshua's last issue mentioned is the award of sole legal and physical 
custody of the parties'children to Cassie. 
HISTORY OF THE CASE 
Joshua and Cassie Clarke were married in September 2002, had two children, 
and lived in Tooele. Once the parties separated in July 2008 under the provisions of a 
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Protective Order issued to Cassie under case #084300356, Joshua moved to the Salt 
Lake valley to live with his parents. 
The Protective Order was replaced by a Mutual Restraining Order entered on 
October 30, 2008 under this divorce case. {Trial Court Record page 45 (TR 45)} 
The parties were before the Court on March 16, 2009, for an OSC concerning 
Joshua's refusal to return certain items of personal property to Cassie, to include a 
tripod and a heirloom B-B gun, and his refusal to sign the application forms for the 
children's passports. Joshua's contempt was certified for an evidentiary hearing 
concerning his refusal to return the personal property and Cassie's attorney's fees. 
(TR71) 
After the parties failed to reach any agreement during mediation in June 2009, 
(TR 77) the case was certified for trial in August 2009 (TR 78) based upon Cassie's 
certification for readiness for trial. (TR 73) 
A pretrial Order listing 5 issues for trial was issued on September 14, 2009. (TR 
80) The five issues certified for trial were limited to: 
a. Parent time schedules as the older child enters school. 
b. Obligations for child support, day care and medical expenses. 
c. Ownership, equity distribution, and possession of marital real property. 
d. Distribution of marital personal property to include those items for which 
certification of respondent's contempt had previously been issued. 
e. Award of the attorney's fees the petitioner incurred in bringing the previous 
OSC hearings before the Court. 
There was no certification of the issue of physical custody of the children and 
no request for a custody evaluation was ever made prior to this certification for trial. 
Joshua's first counsel of record, Russell T. Monahan never requested any custody 
evaluation prior to his withdrawal in January 2009. (TR 49) 
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On October 2, 2009, Joshua's second counsel of record, Grant Morrison 
certified that all discovery had been completed and represented that the matter was 
ready for trial. (TR 82) A bench trial was scheduled for December 17, 2009, following 
the two parties' independent requests for trial. (TR 86) 
Joshua's second attorney made his first Motion to Continue Trial on November 
2, 2009 and then withdrew from the case. (TR 90) 
On December 1, 2009, Joshua's third attorney of record, Larry Larsen 
appeared and requested additional discovery. (TR 95) A hearing was held on 
December 7, 2009 and at that time, for the first time, Joshua demanded to conduct a 
deposition of Cassie. The court continued the trial until January 22, 2010 to 
accommodate the deposition of Cassie based upon Joshua's assurance that it would 
be timely completed without the need to further continue the trial. (TR 93) Joshua 
never conducted any deposition of Cassie. 
Two weeks before the scheduled trial, on January 6, 2010, his third attorney 
filed Joshua's second Motion to Continue (TR 99) and for the first time, Joshua 
demanded the conduct of a custody evaluation via his Motion to Appoint a Custody 
Evaluator. (TR102) 
On January 19, 2010, another pre-trial conference was conducted, at which 
time the court entered the parties' divorce under a bifurcated proceeding and 
rescheduled the trial concerning the five certified issues for March 17, 2010. (TR 114) 
The Custody evaluation was allowed to proceed on the basis that it would not 
delay the trial past March 17, 2010 and that Joshua would fully fund the evaluator's 
cost within 10 days. (TR 149) 
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On February 9, 2010 the court issued an Order appointing a custody evaluator 
that contained the specific requirement that the custody evaluation be completed in 
time for trial on March 17, 2010. (TR 149) 
Joshua's third attorney then withdrew on the next day, February 10, 2010. Mr. 
Larsen was replaced by Joshua's fourth attorney of record Suzzanne Marelius who on 
March 4, 2010, filed Joshua's third Motion to Continue the trial which is the subject of 
this appeal. (TR 182) 
Another pre-trial conference was conducted on March 8, 2010 at which time the 
court denied Joshua's third Motion to Continue. (TR 183) 
The trial was conducted on March 17, 2010 (TR 193) and completed on March 
31, 2010 (TR 195), followed by the court issuing its Memorandum Decision on April 
18, 2010. (TR 212) The court instructed Cassie's attorney to draft the Findings and 
Decree based upon its Memorandum Decision, which he did having served the 
proposed Findings and Decree on Joshua on or about June 16, 2010. 
In August 2010, Joshua objected to the content of the Findings and he filed his 
Motion to Allocate House Equity and to Reconsider Property Division. 
The court conducted a hearing on September 1, 2010 to address Joshua's 
objections to the court's decision and to the proposed findings. {Hearing Transcript 
540 pg 3 Ln 3 (HT 540 pg 3 Ln 3)} During the hearing each objectionable item was 
discussed, the court ruled on the language of each item, and finally instructed 
Cassie's attorney to make the changes announced. (HT 540 pg 82 Ln 3) 
On September 27, 2010, the parties were once again before the court to 
address Joshua's contempt of existing orders. Having found Joshua in "contempt of 
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court for keeping Allie the 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th of September and the 17th though the 
20th when it wasn't his time to have the child," the Court sentenced him to 30 days in 
jail and to pay a $1,000.00 fine. (HT 541 pg 51 Ln 20 - 24) The Court awarded Cassie 
her attorneys fees associated with the OSC process (HT 541 pg 52 Ln 20 - 21), and 
suspended Joshua's jail time but not the $1,000.00 fine, which Joshua has never paid. 
(HT541 pg52Ln11 -19) 
On December 13, 2010, the parties were once again before the Court to hear 
several of Joshua's objections and Motions to include his Motion to Determine Equity 
Amount and Payment Date (HT 541) and to hear Cassie's resistance to the many 
objections. (TR481) 
In response to Joshua's argument that the $32,000 awarded to Cassie for her 
inheritance was to be included in the home equity, the Court ruled, "the [$32,000] 
judgment awarded to Mrs. Clarke was independent of the equity in the house. So, Mr. 
Buhler is correct. The equity is to be divided. There's a judgment separate and apart 
from that."(HT 542 pg 6 Ln 4 -7) 
On December 28, 2011, the court entered the Judgment for Attorney's Fees 
and the Second Amended Findings of Fact and Order for Custody, Support, and Asset 
Division under Decree of Divorce. 
Joshua entered his notice of appeal on January 27, 2011. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This Court should completely reject the appeal made by Joshua Clarke for at 
least three reasons. First, Joshua totally failed to marshal the evidence in his 
appellant's brief as required by the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
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Second, and the most egregious reason his appeal should be rejected is that 
Joshua has either intentionally misstated or simply omitted the facts that do not 
support his claims and in several places, such as his discussion of the division of 
marital assets, Joshua blatantly lied to this Court about the facts established by the 
trial court. Simply stated, Joshua has utterly failed in his duty of candor to this Court 
and to the opposing party. 
Finally, Joshua has appeared before this Court with unclean hands. Although 
he complains loud and long about being fined and sentenced to 30 days in jail for his 
refusal to abide the trial court's orders, he has never paid a dime towards the $1,000 
fine, he never spent a minute in jail for the contempt, he still has not returned certain 
items of personal property to Cassie as ordered several times by the trial court, and as 
of this date, he still has not paid the $5,710.05 judgment for his children's medical, 
daycare, and pre-school expenses awarded to Cassie at trial more than 18 months 
ago. (TR 513) 
In his brief to this Court, Joshua presents what he claims to be nine different 
issues. However, Cassie believes there are actually only four issues before this Court. 
Issue one concerns the division of marital assets, liabilities, and separate property 
between the parties; the second is the award of attorney's fees to Cassie following 
Joshua being found to be in contempt; the third is a procedural issue concerning the 
denial of Joshua's Motion to Continue the trial for a third time; and the last issue 
mentioned is the award to Cassie of the sole legal and physical custody of the parties' 
two children. 
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Be it nine, or four issues, Joshua has utterly failed to marshal the evidence 
found in the case record to support any of his claimed issues on appeal, thus the 
appeal should be denied in its entirety. 
The Division of The Martial Estate was Equitable 
At trial, the trial court properly determined the content of the martial estate to 
essentially be the marital home. Because the parties failed to provide the court with 
necessary information concerning the home's value, the trial court ordered the equity 
in the home to be evenly split, announced two options for the transference of the 
equity between the parties, and directed the parties to return with the needed home 
value information. 
Also at the conclusion of trial, the court determined that Joshua had purchased 
a truck and boat before the parties were married and that at nine years of age, Cassie 
had received a $40,000 inheritance and had kept the money separate until she 
provided a majority of it to Joshua to pay off his truck and boat loans. 
Using the guideline that marital property is ordinarily divided equally and 
separate property such as premarital assets and inheritances will be awarded to the 
acquiring party; the trial court awarded Joshua his truck and boat free of any interest 
in Cassie. Because Cassie had allowed Joshua to use about $32,000 of Cassie's 
inheritance to pay off his truck and boat loans and because Joshua stipulated that 
Cassie should receive her inherited money back, the trial court awarded Cassie an 
offset against Joshua's share of the home equity. 
Months later, when the home equity was finally established to be $57,699, the 
Court awarded each party $28,849.50 of home equity and then applied the previously 
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awarded $32,000 offset for Cassie's inherited funds. Having found the offset 
exceeded Joshua's equity interest, and hearing no plan from him to pay Cassie that 
money, the trial court awarded the marital home to Cassie. 
The trial court found the parties earned approximately the same $3,600 per 
month and that the marital debt consisted of the first and second mortgages on the 
home, a Teamsters credit card, and a debt of $15,951.00 due to Joshua's father for 
previous assistance to the parties with their marital finances. 
The trial court made an equitable distribution of the martial debts in relation to 
the parties incomes and ability to pay monthly bills. Because Cassie was awarded the 
home, she was assigned both mortgage balances totaling about $146,900. The 
parties were ordered to pay one half of the debt to Joshua's father at the rate of no 
less than $200 per month each and Joshua was ordered to assume the Teamsters 
$7,320 credit card debt. 
Simply stated, at the conclusion of the trial, the court made an equitable and 
proper division of the assets and debts between Joshua and Cassie. 
Joshua was contemptuous and there was no error in awarding attorney's fees 
In direct violation of an Order drafted by his own attorney, Joshua kept the 
parties' daughter away from her mother on two different occasions for a total of 8 
days. 
As far back as March 23, 2009, the Commissioner certified Joshua's contempt 
because he refused to return items of personal property to Cassie as previously ordered. 
As of this day, Joshua has still not returned all of Cassie's personal property. 
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At the time of the parties' separation in 2008, Joshua was ordered to pay one half 
of the children's uninsured medical and daycare expenses. Again, in January 2010, he 
was ordered to pay his share of the children's daycare and medical expenses which 
exceeded $7,500 by the time of trial in March 2010. Joshua simply refused to abide the 
Court's order and as of this day, has still not paid these child related expenses. 
In his brief, Joshua also failed to marshal the evidence that he was ordered not 
to sleep with the children in his bed but that he has continued to do so as discussed in 
the pending OSC on this issue. (TR 593) 
There was no error in denying the motion to continue 
Joshua fails to even mention to this Court his prior two Motions to Continue 
which had both been granted by the trial court. Further, Joshua was given permission 
to conduct a last minute custody evaluation only so long as the evaluation would be 
complete in time for the trial that had been continued twice before. 
Just eight business days before trial, Joshua, through his fourth attorney, made 
the subject Motion to Continue based upon the evaluator's letter that he was busy and 
needed more time to complete the evaluation. 
The trial court properly denied Joshua's third Motion to Continue the trial. 
The custody award was based upon sufficient findings 
The trial court went to great lengths in its memorandum decision to list the 
many and varied acts by the two parents, over a lengthy period of time that led the 
court to its final decision concerning custody. Joshua challenged these findings on 
two occasions before the final Order was entered by the trial court, yet he fails to 
marshal the abundance of evidence that led to the Order of which he now complains. 
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The trial court made many specific findings about Joshua's parenting history 
and abilities but his brief mentions nothing about Joshua's refusal to allow his son to 
have timely childhood inoculations until Cassie bribed him with a hot tub and hair 
implants that he wanted. Likewise, his brief says nothing about Joshua's refusal to 
allow his children to receive traditional medical care when suffering for several months 
from a condition that was rapidly cured once proper medical care was received. 
Joshua's brief also failed to state any of the detailed evidence that was before 
the trial court concerning Joshua's "refusal to financially support his children despite Court 
Orders . . . " or that the court had "very serious concerns for the health and safety of the 
children" should Joshua be named as the custodial parent. 
The trial court made extensive and detailed findings concerning its rational for 
the custody award it entered. Therefore, lacking a valid argument fully supported by 
citation to factual evidence, Joshua's challenge must fail and the custody award 
should remain in place. 
In sum, Joshua came to this appeal with completely unclean hands while 
forcing Cassie to expend significant resources that she does not currently possess in 
responding to Joshua's continuous campaign to keep her living under his control. 
Cassie asks this Court, based upon her history of prevailing in the several 
actions below, to allow her to recover both the award of fees she received from the 
trial court and the fees she has incurred in responding to this appeal. 
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ARGUMENT 
LAND II. THE DIVISION OF THE MARTIAL ESTATE WAS EQUITABLE. 
"On appeal, it is the burden of the party seeking to overturn the trial court's 
decision to 'marshal' the evidence in support of the findings and then demonstrate that 
despite this evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking in support as to be 
'against the clear weight of the evidence,' thus making them 'clearly erroneous.'" 
Hagan v. Hagan, 810 P.2d 478 at 481 (Utah App. 1991J (citing Myers v. Myers, 768 
P.2d 979, 984 (Utah App. 1989). 
"[P]arties that fail to marshal the evidence do so at the risk that the reviewing 
court will decline, in its discretion, to review the trial court's factual findings." Beesley v. 
Harris (In re Estate of Beesley), 883 P.2d 1343, 1349 (Utah 1994). 
Concerning challenges to a trial court's findings of fact, the Advisory Committee 
Notes to Utah to Rule 24 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure state: 
Rule 24(a)(9) now reflects what Utah appellate courts have long held. See In re 
Beesley, 883 P.2d 1343, 1349 (Utah 1994); Newmeyerv. Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 
1276, 1278 (Utah 1987). "To successfully appeal a trial court's findings of fact, 
appellate counsel must play the devil's advocate. 'Attorneys must extricate 
themselves from the client's shoes and fully assume the adversary's position. In 
order to properly discharge the marshalling duty..., the challenger must present, in 
comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence 
introduced at trial which supports the very findings the appellant resists."' 
ONEIDA/SLIC, v. ONEIDA Cold Storage and Warehouse, Inc., 872 P.2d 1051, 
1052-53 (Utah App. 1994) (alteration in original)(quoting West Valley City v. 
Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah App. 1991)). 
To reverse the trial courts' award of the marital property, Joshua has the 
burden of compiling every scrap of competent evidence introduced during the trial 
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which supports the property award to which he objects and then, using that evidence, 
he must convince this Court that the trial court abused its very broad discretion in 
making that property award to the parties. 
However, in his brief Joshua has neither marshaled the evidence in support of 
the trial court's findings nor demonstrated that such findings are clearly erroneous, 
citing instead only to the carefully selected evidence from the trial record that supports 
the outcome he desires or in some areas, he simply created "facts" to support his 
claims. 
Division of Martial Estate 
The first issue addressed in Joshua's brief claimed the trial court abused its 
broad discretion when it awarded 100% of the marital estate to Cassie and negative 
equity to Joshua. 
Aside from failing to marshal the evidence before this Court, the problem with 
this claim is that Joshua intentionally misstated several of the facts supporting his 
argument resulting in a patently false claim of his award of negative equity. 
For example, on page 16 of Joshua's brief he claims, "The Court then imposed on 
Respondent, the sole obligation to repay all remaining debts consisting of a Teamster's credit 
card of $9,800." 
However, the trial court stated that "What I wanted to divide between them was the 
debt as it existed at the day of trial." (HT 540 pg 81 Ln 24 - 25) The Teamsters debt on 
March 3, 2010 (two weeks before trial), was $7,320, not the $9,800 debt balance 
Joshua claimed on both page 12 and page 16 of his brief. (HT 538 pg 277 Ln 22 - pg 
278Ln10) 
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Joshua's intentional misquote on page 12, paragraph 12, that "the court ordered 
Respondent to pay the balance of $9,800 solely without assistance by Petitioner" when he 
knew the Court had actually ordered him to pay the $7,320 balance is but one 
example of Joshua's dishonesty before this Court. 
In his brief, Joshua also failed to list several assets in his possession or to even 
mention to this Court that he kept all of the martial collectable coins that were 
purchased using the marital Chase credit card, that became a major portion of the 
debt due to Joshua's father, of which Cassie was ordered to pay one half. (HT 538 pg 
171 Ln 2-16) 
Another example is found in Joshua's brief, again on page 16, where Joshua 
increased the claimed value of Cassie's property distribution by adding in a value of 
$8,549 for her 401 (k), while intentionally failing to make any mention whatsoever of his 
own UPS retirement account or of his $7,000 Roth IRA that he cashed in just two 
months before trial. (HT 538 pg 323 Ln 1 - pg 324 Ln 4) 
Not only did Joshua fail to marshal the evidence presented to the trial court on 
the issue of retirement accounts, but both before and during the trial, he steadfastly 
refused to divulge the actual amounts of his retirement benefits, which the trial court 
found in its Memorandum Decision to be u very disturbing" (TR 278) 
What Joshua also failed to tell this Court about the parties' retirement accounts 
was that the parties agreed that each should keep their own retirement benefits. (TR 
278) In light of this agreement, it was most disingenuous for Joshua to inflate the 
value of Cassie's claimed property distribution by adding her retirement benefit to her 
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equity account while intentionally not mentioning, let alone accounting for his own 
multiple retirement benefits. 
In his negative equity argument, Joshua also chose not to mention to this Court 
that he kept $10,000 worth of hair plugs Joshua received in exchange for allowing his 
children to be immunized as described below. Nor did he mention that Cassie alone 
was required to pay for Joshua's $10,000 worth of hair without contribution from him 
because the money for the hair plugs came from the second mortgage that was 
ordered to be Cassie's sole obligation to pay. (HT 538 pg 32 Ln 12-21) Joshua also 
failed to list at trial or to mention to this Court any of the expensive personal property 
he was awarded such as a $400.00 flour mill. (HT 538 pg 334 Ln 3 - 15) 
The issue in this section is that Joshua intentionally misstated the factual 
support for his appeal by many thousands of dollars, which outside of his failure to 
marshal the evidence, should be fatal to the appeal of this issue. 
Identification of Martial vs. Separate Property 
The second issue Joshua raises in his Brief is that the trial court failed to fairly 
divide the marital assets. However, throughout this portion of his brief, Joshua fails to 
distinguish between separate and marital property. 
On page of his brief, Joshua cites to Olsen v. Olsen 169 P.3d 765 (not listed in 
his Cases list) when he correctly states that marital property is ordinarily divided 
equally and separate property such as premarital assets and inheritances will be 
awarded to the acquiring party. 
Joshua also correctly states that there was no dispute that Cassie had received 
a $40,000 inheritance when she was 9 years old and that Joshua was awarded the 
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truck and boat that he had purchased before he married Cassie. Therefore, Cassie's 
inheritance and Joshua's truck and boat were each identified as non-marital separate 
property, were each ordered to be returned to the rightful owner and were each 
properly excluded from the martial estate before any division of the marital property 
took place. 
In its Memorandum Decision based in part on Joshua's stipulation that Cassie 
receive her inherited money back, the trial court ordered that the equity in the home be 
divided equally and allowed a $32,000 offset to Cassie for a portion of her inheritance. 
Although it had awarded the return to Cassie of $32,000 her inheritance, at the 
time of its Memorandum Decision, the trial court did not have enough information 
concerning the value of the home to award specific amounts of equity, so it ordered 
the parties to gather that information and return to Court so that the home equity 
award could be made based upon accurate information. 
On December 13, 2010, the parties did return to the court and the parties 
agreed that the home had $57,699.00 of equity, not counting any costs of a sale. That 
resulted in each party being awarded $28,849.98 of home equity. Once the $32,000 
offset was applied, that left Joshua owing Cassie $3,150.00, which she waived. (TR 
516) 
In its final order, the trial court made a very detailed finding on this issue when it 
stated "The equal division of this total equity results in each party having a $28,849,985 
interest in the home. Cassie has waived the $3,150.00 negative balance that results once her 
$32,000 offset for her inherited funds is applied to Joshua's 1A interest in the equity. 
Therefore, Cassie is awarded the sole possession and ownership of the martial home located 
at 223 West Regatta Lane, Stansbury Park, with no interest to Joshua." (TR 516) 
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Throughout his brief, Joshua repeatedly and intentionally fails to separate the 
marital estate from the non-marital separate property. On page 23 of his brief for 
example, Joshua states that "Without any consideration of separate contributions, each 
party in this case should thus have received $28,350. However, the trial Court's calculation in 
this case reimbursed to Petitioner her separate contribution to the truck and boat loans of 
$32,000 resulting in an adjusted joint equity of $25,699. Under a usual division, both parties 
would thus receive $12,850. However, the trial court exercised its discretion and awarded the 
Respondent's $12,850 to Petitioner giving him $0 equity." 
This statement to this Court is a bald faced lie and Joshua knows that because 
he made this same argument to the trial court and was told that was not what had 
been ordered. (HT 542 pg 6 Ln 4 - 7) 
First, the determination that Cassie's $32,000 was her inheritance occurred at 
the time of trial in March 2010, whereas the determination of the marital home equity 
did not occur until 6 months later in December 2010. (HT 542 pg 4 Ln 5 - 11) 
When Joshua made this same argument to the trial court, that the $32,000 
awarded to Cassie for her inheritance was to be included in the home equity 
calculation, the trial court specifically rejected that argument by stating "the [$32,000] 
judgment awarded to Mrs. Clarke was independent of the equity in the house. So, Mr. Buhler 
is correct. The equity is to be divided. There's a judgment separate and apart from that" (HT 
542 pg 6 Ln 4 - 7). 
The truth is that the trial court did award Joshua his $28,350 equal share of the 
home equity once that value had been established. What Joshua intentionally does 
not tell this Court is that the trial court went on to determine that the most fair way for 
Cassie to receive her $32,000 back from Joshua was to allow her to take an offset 
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against his share of the home equity, which exceeded the $28,350 Joshua had been 
a w • ; • ' • < 
-.*••' 'ai=jr- :. - ' M M • -larshal these lacts in s..-<p! *1 of his appeal along witl i 
his in itei itior lal i i lisstater r lents ol tat t • -• In>111«I lit1 tatai in milm dppv mi ni mis isMie. 
Determination of the separate nature of Cassie's inheritance and the value of assets 
Josfitiid f * drs mi (Jdye 2fi I hi1 hunt th ill 111# |niniiiiv isselk- HI lllliir riiiinl ill 
estate were his tn ick and boat and the rai-r;». norne and that tht- 1<;HI ,:o .<• ../ar.ied 
Cassie $2, 100 ii i a bank a rmn ; ,, .> 
awarded Cassie the health oaie fund w...ui« inay nave $2, ; X /// ,t. VTR 515, 
As discussed above, the truck and boat were determined to be Joshua's 
Therefore, these two assets were never inch ided in tt ie marital estate and there is no 
e n i Ill: } 1:1 i e t i •j « , 
were not i n c , j o - i < rne d iv i ^c i . ~; ..'iartia; property by the T ,*I .- .,»: 
Concerning the vain ^ T P a^ described above, tl ie trial court made more 
thar : ' . -v *•* •• * - stablish the valiie of the marital 
home at $57,699.97. (TR 5 16) In additioi i, the parties stipulated to that vali \e in 
December 2010. 
riecause on page 40 of his brief, instead of citing the actual findings i i lade by It! ie 
findings actually signed by the trial couit, and because he again used intentional 
misstatements to support the outcome he desired, this issue should be rejected from 
consideration by this Coi ir t. 
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Cassie did carry her burden to establish her inheritance 
Concerning Joshua's claim that the trial court never established the separate 
nature of Cassie's inheritance, at trial Joshua's attorney asked Cassie "so you 
maintained this inheritance since you were nine years old and is that still in your separate 
name?" to which Cassie replied yes. (HT pg 99 Ln 1-5) Further, on no less than two 
occasions when testifying before the Court, Joshua stipulated that he was willing to 
pay Cassie the money she paid out of her inheritance for his truck and boat. (HT 538 
pg 330 Ln 21 - pg 331 Ln 2) (HR 538 pg 290 Ln 16 - 21) Therefore, the trial court had 
adequate evidence before it that Cassie has used a major portion of her pre-marital 
inheritance to the sole benefit of Joshua and that he had stipulated to the money's 
return to Cassie. 
Joshua also failed to marshal the evidence considered by the trial court in 
making its determination that Cassie had used her inheritance to benefit Joshua and 
in the process Joshua made additional misstatements of fact. 
For example, on page 27 of his brief, Joshua claims that "In the first instance the 
Respondent disputed Petitioner's testimony of her contribution to his loans of $32,000 (T. 
03/17/10, pg 287)". In fact, what was actually said was: 
Q Isn 't it true she paid $23,000 for your boat out of her inheritance ? 
A She paid something to pay off the boat. The amount I'm not exactly sure without 
proof 
Q What about your truck? 
A Yes, she did pay that off also. 
Q Are you willing to give her back her 23,000? 
A If she shows proof. 
Q Sir, are you willing to give her back her $23,000? 
MS. MARELIUS: Objection, two objections to his hostile attitude which is intended 
to upset my client. It is not necessary to do that. It's argumentative and 
20 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
bullying. No* 2, asked and answered. He doesn't know how much it was and it 
wasn't 23,000. 
THE COURT: I don't think the attitude is foi that purpose and yot // client avoided 
answering the question which calls for a second 01 le He doesn't answer 
whether he would do that or not. He throws his owi ? question in instead and that's 
what's caused a whole bunch of delay and how this is working, Mr Buhlet can 
jtat dgau * u.i *''v* uuestion
 f ; v ,> rimit neods to answer the questions. 
MS. MARE LI US Sa\ . '• ^ ., nuswei yes, i i :), I don't kno\ i or. 
M W- Rt
 tJ>,r> -\* • '; ;. f>/ u'.'/«.v -^  <?/* *r/.; • / le said I doi ftki io\ i low 
*i • — ' - ' » » ; . • * - .0' •! r- fs a terrible questioi i ) hat's 
i ? ot 
VIR, BUHLER: I'll t ephrase the question, 
BY MR. BUHL ER: 
Q Would you pay her back the amount of money that she paid out of her inheritance 
towards your boat? 
\ V es /1 vould. " '• 
Q Are you willing to pay back the amount of money that she paid out of her 
inheritance towards your truck? 
y \ Yes, I would. 
(HT 538 pg 289 In i i - pg 290 Ln 2 1) 
' N o w before this Court, J o s h u a intentionally misstates what was actually said 
dii nil inn 11 the Ihrulll Hi • spying ho tlispukMj I  mi lo«,liinon\ ' a lmul her separate conlnbutions 
to his loans, when he actually agreed that she had made such contributions, but that 
he ": imply did not know the precise amounts 
Joshua also tries to inti oduce evidence of lUef -iyments in this Coin t that was 
not presented at trial and was specifically rejected hv "'-r H a l con irt in it Memorandum 
Decision of "ippilei i ill n i ll'i -"iHili ( I P M\\) VW) 
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Worse than all of that, on page 26 of his brief, Joshua just plain lied to this 
Court when he stated "the actual boat and truck loan payoffs that totaled only $14,960" 
when the documents Joshua submitted to, but that were rejected by the trial court, 
showed the total boat and truck payoff to be $24,859.93. (TR 69 - 68) 
The $9,900 difference between what Joshua told this Court and the loan payoff 
amounts he tired to provide to the trial court is another serious misstatement of fact by 
Joshua. This dishonesty should be sanctioned by the award of the attorney's fees 
Cassie has incurred in responding to this issue in addition to the Court declining to 
consider this issue on appeal. 
Comingling argument not applicable to Cassie's inheritance 
In his argument on this issue Joshua continues to falsely claim that the trial 
court did not award an equal division of the marital estate (marital home equity) and 
once again as discussed above, falsely states that the trial court awarded Cassie 
100% of the martial estate while awarding Joshua negative value. 
Also once again, Joshua failed to marshal the ample evidence before the trial 
court when it made its findings. In this section of his brief, Joshua failed to make a 
single citation to the trial record. 
Joshua certainly did not mention to this Court that while testifying under oath, 
he stipulated that the inherited money Cassie had paid towards his truck and boat 
should be returned to her and that he was willing to return that money to her thereby 
creating a stipulation to the effect. (HT 538 pg 289 Ln 12 - pg 290 Ln 21) Joshua chose 
not to present any evidence at trial about his use of Cassie's inherited money, stating 
only he did not know how much it was. Rather, after the trial court's decision was 
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announced, Joshua then produced soi ne numbers coi icerning the loan amoi ints that 
hi mi iw lues h Iinnnrh h, " 11 $!* l»i)M. 
Joshua also did not mention to this (. f . , i - ' M I . swo; • * -. - 1 1- z\ar^ i 
he failed to list tl lat he was in possess*. ! in of nair piugs 1 . ' d ^ -
was ordered to solely pay foi as part of her second n lortgage (HT 53•? n ) ^ L... .v,-
22x AUat he was in the sole possession of collectable coins that had a substantial cost 
which Cassie was ordered to pay one half ( 1 R 538 pg 332 I n 12 • 20), or that he was 
he sii i iply "forgot" to put the items on tf le pi operty list. (HT 538 pg 334 Ln 3 15) 
As with the above discussed issues, because Joshua failed in any manner 
whatsoever to i i lai si lal the evidence conceri 111 lg tl lis issi le, this Coi irt shoi jld decline, 
in its discretion, to review the trial court's factual findings/" Beesiey v Harris ( In re 
Estate of Beesiey), 383 P.2d 1343, 1349 (I It; 1! 1 199 1 ) 
HI- JOSHUA C L A R K E WAS CONTEMPTUOUS OF THE C O U R T S ORDERS 
AND THERE WAS NO ERROR IN AWARDING A i I ORNEY'S FEES 
The Utah Legislature has provided statutory contempt authority, see Utah Code 
Ann '} 78B-(>-302 i7!0G8l ' hii.h h >gethi:M i i l i l i i II II! IK is ::: : ) i 1 111: 1  1 ::)i 1  law, provides the basis 1 r a 
Utah court's power to hold offenders in contempt. See Vot ? Hake, 759 P.2d at 1166-
6 / I Hah Code section /8B-6-3U2 provides, .• 
(1) W h e n a contempt is committed in the immediate view ar id pr esence of the 
court, or judge at chambers, it may be punished summarily,, An order shall be 
in in iade, reciting the facts occurring ii 1 the in in lediate view and presence of the cc ' 
1 he order shall state that the person proceeded against is gi lilty of a contempt and 
shall be punished as prescribed in Section 78B-6-310. 
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(2) When the contempt is not committed in the immediate view and presence of 
the court or judge, an affidavit or statement of the facts by a judicial officer shall be 
presented to the court or judge of the facts constituting the contempt. 
In addition to coming before this Court having never served a minute of jail time 
nor having ever paid a dime of the $1,000.00 fine levied for his contempt, Joshua has 
not marshaled the evidence in support of the trial court's finding of contempt, he has 
not demonstrated that such findings are clearly erroneous, and more important, he 
has, in his brief, once again changed the truth of the matter to a fiction that he desires 
to have this Court believe. 
On page 32 of his brief, Joshua states "Respondent appeals the Order on Order to 
Show Cause entered by the Court December 13, 2010 holding him in contempt for improperly 
keeping the parties' daughter for parent time to which he was not entitled from September 6, 
2010 at 7:00 p.m. until Friday September 10, 2010 at 5:30 p.m., a period of 4 days." 
(emphasis added) 
Joshua falsely claims he was held in contempt for keeping the parties' daughter 
for a period of 4 days. A review of the transcript of that hearing shows that the trial 
court stated "I'm finding Mr Clarke in contempt of court for keeping Allie the 7th, 8th, 9th and 10th of 
September and the 17th through the 20th when it wasn't his time to have the child." (HT 541 pg 51 
Ln20-pg52Ln19) 
It is clear from the transcript that Joshua failed to point out to this Court that the 
trial court found Joshua had kept the parties daughter away from her mother on two 
different occasions for a total of 8 days, not the single occasion lasting 4 days Joshua 
has asked this Court to believe. This is just one more intentional misstatement made 
by Joshua to lessen the appearance of his wrongdoing. 
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Joshua goes oi i to claim on page 34 of his bi ief that "It is clear from the testimony 
com t He also did / lot show a pattern of contempt / ior any "obstinacy" to result in a finding of willful 
contempt" 
Because Joshua has again completely failed to marshal the evidence befor e 
the ol Cdiih-Miipl and "obstinac* "' thai hi , > 
has displayed throughout this divorce action is in order 
Beginning with the Cor i imissioner's certification of his conten ipt on Mai cl i 23, 
2009, because he refused to return items of personal pi opei ty to Cassie as pi eviously 
ordered r r o "^ and 287), thi? °~ ir+ should know that as of this date, Joshua has still not 
n * i 
Although the ^:,ur ^ jered Josin a in January 20 in to pay his share ot the 
children's day, - *• * :xceeded$,i bOOl^ lho turn , Il lual, 
Joshua simply r^tu^.i \n .^ hi'j- ^ ^ ^ , . « ,< its Memorandum Decision following 
trial, the ti ial com t found Josi lua in contempt for this refusal as stated :~ + k^ n r~~:n~ 
"When the parties separated, the respondent closed all the bariK a * * - .• 3 
credit cat ds out of petitioner "s name, at id left her without any mean.-*
 JS *.^v„ ; -xc.epf 
friends and family: After a Couii Order was entered rm^uiring him '<> sun^c^r >• children, 
health ca^i e^ptri^os « ) / has *efuseu u,- nny his share of work-related daycare, despite 
a §pecjfjc QrcjQf jf 1 JQf n , . " " ' t ' - ,'*.\ • •! 
payments. His willful and kixMitiy tetijs.ii -u m bu esur *„• j "itKh'h] o; conte > ? of 
Court for his failure to make those payments," (TR 289) 
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As demonstrated by the April 19, 2010, Memorandum Decision (TR 289), Joshua 
falsely claims on page 35 of his brief that the trial court finding him in contempt on 
September 27, 2010, "was the first violation by Mr. Clarke . . . " 
Joshua failed to tell this Court that he was ordered not to sleep with the children 
in his bed (HT 538 pg 308 Ln 8 - pg 309 Ln 7) but still does so as discussed in the 
pending OSC on this issue. (TR 593) 
Despite Joshua's claims, the record is replete with facts supporting the findings 
of contempt against him. For more than three years, Joshua simply refused to comply 
with the orders of the trial court and yet he appears before this Court claiming he 
should not have been held in contempt by that court any time. 
In his appeal, Joshua has neither marshaled the evidence in support of the trial 
court's findings nor demonstrated that such findings are clearly erroneous. 
Accordingly, this Court should view the evidence in a light most favorable to the 
district court and assume that the factual findings are sufficiently supported by the 
evidence presented at trial. Joshua's complete failure to marshal the evidence when 
challenging the trial court's findings must be fatal to his appeal of this issue. 
Award of Fees 
On page 36 of his brief Joshua claims that Cassie's attorney fee affidavit is 
overbroad and included charges for such things as drafting the Divorce Decree and 
that the "vast majority of fees being requested have no relationship to the Order to Show 
Cause issue on September 27." 
Again, Joshua failed to marshal the evidence in the record and again misstated 
the true facts of the situation. Joshua simply failed to inform this Court that this 
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incident of the Coi irt finding Joshua in contei npt on Septei nber 27, 2010 actually 
stalled IAIIIIMMII in i »M ho^nini i nni,i>ih IU Jn\!nj,i «>, i mm urn.) iiHu -HI! In tiiiininl'i ii'tmii llii 
children to Cassie was scheduled for July V? 9(1)0 att-*r an OCS with it si ipporting 
doci imentation was draftee . -• •. -.. :.,,•, icket for entry on Ji n i 3 1 i;: 
2010) 
After conferring with the parties' counsel on July 8th the Court contini i 3d that 
was rescheduled for August 2, 2010 At that time, Cassie and her attorney appeal ed 
represented to the Court by phone that she had she never received notice of the 
hearing. • • 
Because Joshua had in not i eti irned the cl mil ::li en i tc Cassie c j i h iillh 3 1, 20 10, she 
was forced to seek and was granted a Writ of Assistance to help Cassie retrieve hei 
child! ei i am id til r B I iea.ii ii ig was i esc! ledi iled foi * :!* i igi ist - II , 20 10. - • • 
At the August 4th hearing, all pai ties were present and the parties entered ai i 
agreement concerning exter ided parent time to ii iclude that each parent woi jld have 
the children o n e week at a time and that Joshua would have an additional 2 y eeks ii i 
the summer of 2011. loshua's attorney was directed to draft the Order memorialiizii ig 
this agreement. 
On August 9 2010 the Court held a phone conference with the parties' 
i.omi'.i-.'l rind »il Ill • . ,->t in jiJiiitHiii nil IIIMIIIII] Iof September I' '" to heai J arious 
issues, to include Cassie's allegations that Joshua repeatedly failed to timely i etui i i 
tl le : I iiildren aftei periods of scl leduled parent time. • • 
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On September 1, 2010, at the scheduled time, Cassie was present with her 
attorney but Joshua was not present. Joshua's attorney was present and represented 
to the Court that he was on his way and expected to arrive soon. Although the 
hearing lasted from 13:36 until well after 15:30, Joshua never did appear. 
At that time, Joshua's attorney presented her proposed Order concerning 
parent time. The Court made its "Final Ruling" that, for this year, Joshua was to have 
the children for the Labor Day holiday and that Joshua would return the children to 
their mother's home no later than 7:30 pm on September 6, 2010. (TR 333) The 
parties' attorneys each signed that Order. However, in spite of the direct order written 
and signed by his attorney, Joshua failed to return the parties' daughter to Cassie on 
September6, 2010. 
Another OCS was issued on September 8, 2010 alleging Joshua was in 
contempt for this failure to timely return the daughter and the OSC hearing was 
scheduled for September 20, 2010. (TR 356) 
On or about September 16th, Joshua's attorney filed a Motion to Continue the 
hearing from September 20, 2010 at 9:00 am, stating she had a calendar conflict that 
morning in Salt Lake City. Cassie's attorney agreed to move the hearing until the 
afternoon to resolve the calendar conflict, but on September 17th, Joshua's attorney 
contacted the Court again requesting a continuance of the September 20th hearing. 
The Court ruled that the hearing would not be continued if Mr. Clarke still had 
the children with him. Late in the day on September 17th, Joshua's attorney contacted 
the Court Clerk and they together contacted Cassie's attorney requesting that he 
agree to continue the hearing from the afternoon of September 20th until a later date. 
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In response to that request from Joshua's atton iey, Cass ie 's attorney agreed 
that sin luny as Insliiin li.nl isnluiiitf MI HIN paities < J - -* • i< • l • 11 i In Cass ie |jy i1 ,311 pin mi 
September 17, 2.010, then he would not object to the .oquest to continue the O S C 
hearing i intil Septen iber 2 J IJ" 
O n September 18, 20 10, Cass ie ' s attorney was i lotified tfiaf Joshua h ; 1 tru- i 
to return the daughter to Cassie on the evening of September 17, 2010. Cass ie ' s -
altoiiif-1' ' i null's IIaiIn Hire1 \\ ilelivm 
the daughter as agreed between c o u n s e l He also notified Joshua 's attorney that 
because Joshua had i efused to abide til le agreement m i lade the previous day, he 
expected to see her and hei client at 1:30 oi i the afternoon of September 20th for the 
hearrg as ix ha~! r~v ious ly hee~ scheduled. 
.iffo'i * s <eithe- Joshua * .* > -m .a ' sa t l o «•-- '.-rst ' Cass ie ? attor iey 
is i|j'iM snii lnl l In 11 ic i mill Hut! Il"1 '"Il i Luke hind lyaiiti leiiivtsil lo lelumi the dauqlliitei as 
had been agreed between counsel and that Josh i ia's attorney had been notified on 
September 18th to be at the hearing or i Septembei 2( "* absence of the 
respondent and his counsel , the Court rescSp-ms- iJ , l • • 
2010 and issued a minute Order prohibiting Josrm * •:. --wing parent time until the 
()S( linannq was i i hinplnh M I. 
Oi i September 27th the parties were ai" * • i- .our nea-'u dire- I *nd 
moss, ex:ai i iiiiiiafii in U stum i i and ther i.^o * - -,., s mpt rinding 
against Joshua and awarded Cass ie her attorney's fees. (TR 376-374) 
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The complained of Affidavit of Fees requests a judgment only for attorney's 
fees Cassie incurred throughout this 4 month period of time that were directly related 
to the OSC process that finally culminated on September 27, 2010 with an Order for 
fees as described above. 
Contra to Joshua's claim, of the total $6,825.00 in fees charged between June 
1, 2010 and October 3, 2010, the fees for drafting the degree and other actions 
completed during this time period, not directly related to this OSC process, were not 
requested nor awarded in the $3,129.00 judgment. (TR 374, 370 -369) 
Clearly, each and every fee requested had a direct "relationship to the Order to 
Show Cause issue on September 27," not just the "vast majority of fees being requested" as 
alleged by Joshua. 
The award of fees to Cassie was based on adequate and detailed evidence 
which Joshua never successfully disputed at the trial court level and his challenge 
made to this Court was not supported by the marshaling of any credible evidence, 
thus the award of attorney's fees to Cassie by the trial court should stand as entered. 
THERE WAS NO ERROR IN DENYING THE MOTION TO CONTINUE 
As with the briefing of his other issues, Joshua once again purposefully fails to 
marshal the evidence in the record that provides ample justification for the trial court to 
deny his third Motion to Continue. Joshua fails to even mention his prior two Motions 
to Continue (TR 90 & 99) which had both been granted by the trial court. 
Joshua certainly did not mention in his brief that the Custody Evaluator was 
appointed with the specific requirement that the evaluation be completed in time for 
trial on March 17, 2010. (TR 149) 
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The history of this issue which was not marshaled in Joshua's brief includes the 
fach that { 1} Ji isliiiii.r- *» ;i L in<;H U! IM mil Russell I I  lm n 1 c• I i n^'i n- miesli-'il 
a ny custody evaluation prior to his withdrawal in January 2009 • '• p vo. m**- {2} 
Joshi ia's second counsel of record Grant Morrison, never requested any cuslody 
2009, the Commissioner conducted a pre-trial conference with Joshua's second 
counsel oil u CUIIJ /Im III in 'UiilllaJ in a pinlii ill Urdm bi iiiny ntileiod mi iepLtiiiibt i I I 
2009 wherein the Commissioner did not certify the issi ie of child custody, as only the 
parent time schedilie once the older child entered set- -m vas discussed or certified 
for trial. (TR pq Miif, {4} tlwii • \ Hlnbr ;\ >>()( - * -. s -ittmn^ '> ini i I MM 
certified tha ht -M jmpleted all disc^/«-r« R f,q 82); {5} that on Octobe '9 ; I, 
t\ IE AJi .> . , , . )j, (b) in. oe . 
2009, Grant Morrison requested a continuation of the ti ial ( rR pg 90); {7} that a 
hearing was scheduled for December 7, 2009 (TR pg 92); {8} that on December "* 
2 , i r i v I HI'-ie in in appeal nil as Joshua's, lliiiiiinil alloum1 nil inuonll ai in -
of litigation, requested to conduct a deposition even though his predecessor counsel. 
had certified discovery tc: be compl* ,h . „ ,.s - request, t» ial 
was rescheduled until January 22, 2010 to allow time foi Josllua's iequested 
deposition which never occurred (TR 93); {10} that just 12 business days before the 
trial MS schedule) I In of i in Inshua's til unit I IMMIIN-'Y nil mini mrt rpi|imsted aum ill lint 
contii luation of the trial (TR pg 99), stating that Joshua had suddenly desired the 
-. : . .* . ie :;ourt 
bifurcated the divorce and the custody evaluation issue was discussei : . 
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between counsel and the trial judge and that Joshua's third attorney of record 
stipulated that Joshua would fully fund the custody evaluation and assured the Court 
that the evaluation would be completed in the following two months before the 
scheduled trial date of March 17, 2010 (TR 114); {12} that the Court memorialized this 
ruling in the Order of February 9, 2010, drafted by Joshua's third attorney of record, 
which states in the judge's handwriting "The child custody evaluation shall be finalized 
by the date of trial in this matter, March 17, 2010." (TR 149); {13} that just 8 business 
days before the trial on March 4, 2010, Joshua's fourth attorney of record Suzzanne 
Marelius filed yet another Motion to Continue (TR 182); {14} that the Court held a 
phone conference concerning Joshua's third Motion to Continue on March 8, 2010, at 
which time his third Motion to Continue was denied wherein the court stated in its 
Notes, that all parties were aware of the requirement to be ready for trial on March 17, 
2010. (TR 183) 
Trial was then conducted on March 17 2010 as scheduled and again on March 
31, 2010. Joshua's third Motion to Continue is the subject of this appeal issue. 
Although it appears that Joshua's fourth attorney failed to obtain any transcript 
of that crucial court hearing of January 19, 2010, when the parties were actually 
divorced, it does not seem to matter, as he has failed to marshal any of the other facts 
stated above. Joshua's brief simply states that his Motion to Continue was denied, but 
he never mentioned the two preceding Motions to Continue that were granted by the 
trial court. 
Without any citation to the record, Joshua mentions a letter from the custody 
evaluator that allegedly states he can't complete the evaluation prior to March 17, 
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2010, but he failed to mention the Order of February 9, 2010, which states " The 
2010. (TR 149) ' •• ' 
Joshua's citation to tl le Gi iffitt is \ / lammond 560 f >.2d 13 75 and Boice v. 
Marble 982, P 2d 568 in his brief to support his position that he -•.honlrl have lieeni 
granted a third continuance, are not supportive of his claim. 
^ The Griffith* > Hnm MH Jaledl " | H | yu\\\\ r mol q u a l e d a i oiniiliiiiiiiiaiiii c 
as a matter of right, but rather as an act of discretion by the coui t and the inability of 
counsel to be present at the time set foi trial does not necessarily entitle the client to a 
continuance." Id. I I le Griffiths action had nothing whatsoever to do with the testimr n\ 
of a custody evaluator or any expert testimony as the case concerned the enli y ot a 
default ||i(dj"|ii]eiiil dim flu » dedeiid nil " nun Hppe.llHIn t a! lliill 
Although Joshua mis-cited his second case Boice v: Marble as 982 F ?d 566 
rati M .1 Ihan i iy j , lJI Jd bbd, the essence of that case concerns the substitution of one 
medical expert for another expert two months before the scheduled trial date. 
Whereas Joshua's third Motion to Continue was made just 8 business clays befoi e the 
trial and after his thud atlnnii « / n\ tm imill had '.tipullatml la the ireffnireinenf llh ruslml\ " 
evaluator report was to be ready toi fnal on March 17, /'0 111 I 
Ir i s hi1, in.tliilil I  [HHst'ii l ain wxpiMl s lestimnii ' , al III! ill 
but fails to mention that he chose not to secure that expert for the 18 months between 
(he II it II mi ay of (lite case and the Ihinail, 
J o s h u a ' s c la im that "it was error for the tnr-x mc^ iu ue/ - t - r , - •• 
one month to allow completion of the evaluation" is an intentional misstatement of fact 
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in that it is an intentional omission of the evidence before the court concerning the 
previous two continuances that had been granted. As such, this Court must reject 
Joshua's demand to find error and should punish this dishonesty with the award of the 
attorney's fees incurred by Cassie in responding to this issue. 
V. THE CUSTODY AWARD WAS BASED UPON SUFFICIENT FINDINGS 
Concerning the custody award of the children, Cassie believes this is most 
important and should have been discussed first. Her position is that the trial court 
went to great lengths in its Findings to list the many and varied acts by the two 
parents, over a lengthy period of time, that led the court to its final decision concerning 
custody. 
Once again, in his brief, Joshua simply creates facts in the attempt to support 
his position. Concerning the issue of physical custody, Joshua states on his page 41 
that the trial court failed to give "proper weight to Respondents clearly established role as 
the primary care taker of the children during the marriage" 
However, Joshua fails to provide the Court with a single citation to the record 
concerning the "Respondent's clearly established role as the primary care taker of the 
children during the marriage" Joshua gave no citation to the record because the record 
says nothing whatsoever about who was the primary caregiver for the Clarke children. 
In fact, on page 41 of his brief he even complains that "the court failed to identify a 
primary caretaker in any fashion in his findings" 
Although Joshua did marshal the fact that Cassie was awarded the "primary 
physical custody of the two children" at the time of separation in 2008 (TR 44), common 
sense would dictate the lack of designation of one parent as the primary caregiver 
34 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
given the parties' lengthy history of shared care giving. This history was clearly stated 
in the trial court's findings: 
During the marriage and through the separation, the parties have worked shifts which are 
approximately opposite each other, allowing them to avoid surrogate care for the children. 
Cassie has been a Wal-Mart driver coordinator, working Tuesday through Friday from 5:30 
a.m. to 4:00 p.m. This has been a consistent schedule for at least five years. Joshua has 
worked for UPS from 5:00 to 6:30 p.m. to 4:00 a.m., which has also been consistent for 
several years. Therefore, during the marriage he took care of the children during the day, 
and she had them overnight. The evidence was in dispute with respect to whether or not 
Joshua fell asleep when he should have been watching the children during the day, and 
whether or not he took care of the home. (TR 522) 
Joshua is correct in his citations to case law concerning custody awards, as 
exampled by the statement "In considering competing claims to custody between fit parents 
under the "best interests of the child" standard, considerable weight should be given to which 
parent has been the child's primary caregiver" Pusey v. Pusey, 728 P.2d 117, 120 (Utah 
1986), but other that his self-serving claim, he fails to provide this Court with any 
evidence that he was ever established to be the primary care taker of the children. 
Neither party can point to case law that establishes who is the primary care 
taker of the children when the two parents each provide care to the children while the 
other parent is at work. 
Also on page 41 of his brief, Joshua tries to mislead this Court by claiming that 
he "was the only parent who could continue to provide personal care for the children while 
petitioner needed surrogate care due to her work schedule." Given the undisputed fact that 
Joshua works a 40 hour week over 5 days, he would obviously need to provide over 
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40 hours of surrogate care each week, the same as Cassie who works her 40 hours 
during 4 days each week. 
Returning to the issue of the trial court's findings, Joshua falsely claims the 
findings made by the trial court only reflect only parenting style and parental character 
but did not identify the parenting ability or history of the parties, which is precisely what 
the trial court findings did describe. 
The trial court made many specific findings about Joshua's parenting history 
and abilities in its Memorandum Decision but his brief mentions nothing about 
Joshua's refusal for 2 years to allow his child to receive timely childhood inoculations 
until Cassie bribed him with $10,000 in hair plugs and a $15,000 hot tub that he 
wanted. (TR 526 - 525) (HT 538 pg 16 Ln 13 - 24) (HT 538 pg 17 Ln 14-18) Although 
Joshua tried at trial to deny any connection between his hair plugs and his finally 
allowing his children to receive their childhood immunizations, Joshua was forced on 
cross examination to admit he got hair plugs in July 2007 and the kids got their 
immunizations starting in July 2007. (HT 538 pg 212 Ln 20 - pg 215 Ln 20) 
Joshua's brief also fails to mention the trial court's findings concerning Joshua's 
refusal to allow traditional medical care for his child. The trial court found that Josh 
saw his child had an open, festering rash for about 6 months and refused to allow 
Cassie to take the child to a medical physician. (HT 538 pg 15 Ln 2 - pg 16 Ln 17) 
After months of watching her child suffer, Cassie, over Joshua's objections, took the 
child to a medical and Joshua was furious even though the prescribed medicine 
rapidly cleared up the rash. (TR 525) The trial court also found that Joshua had 
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stated his willingness to block immunizations for the children if he were given joint 
legal custody. 
Although Joshua did mention his version of several trial court Findings 
beginning on page 40 of his brief, Joshua left unmentioned the trial court's statement: 
Cassie shall be awarded sole legal and physical custody of the children subject to Joshua's 
expanded parent time as outlined below. This ruling is based upon very serious concerns 
for the health and safety of the children; and Joshua's refusal to financially support his 
children despite Court Orders, his inability to compromise; his refusal to cooperate; his 
inflexibility, which appears to be a factor in his entire life, not just parenting; his attitude 
toward medical treatment, combined with this inflexibility, refusal to compromise and 
difficulty making decisions could result in serious harm to the children if he were the 
custodial parent As noted above, he testified that if he had joint legal custody, he would 
be able to block immunizations, so he shouldn't have legal custody either The Court 
makes this ruling cognizant of the fact that Cassie has ignored Court Orders also, and has 
blocked parent time between Joshua and the children, therefore, the parent time schedule 
needs to be inflexible, with as little ability to deviate on the part of the custodial parent as 
possible."(TR 521) 
Joshua also failed to marshal the court's stated Ve/y serious concerns for the 
health and safety of the children" should Joshua be the custodial parent. (TR 521) 
As noted in the statement above, the trial court stated another of the reasons 
for awarding Cassie the children's custody was Joshua's "refusal to financially support 
his children despite Court Orders . . . " (TR 521) Further, the trial court found that: 
When the parties separated, Joshua closed all the bank accounts, took the credit cards out 
of Cassie's name, and left her without any means of support, except friends and family. 
After a Court Order was entered requiring him to support his children, he has paid child 
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support as ordered, however, he has not paid his share of work-related daycare despite a 
specific Order in January of 2010 requiring him to immediately start making such payments. 
His willful and knowing refusal to do so results in a finding of contempt of Court for his 
failure to make those payments. (TR 524) 
Custodial Interference 
In his brief, Joshua complains that the trial court failed to give sufficient weight 
to Cassie's conviction for custodial interference. But again, Joshua failed to tell this 
Court the complete story that was before the trial court when it made its findings. For 
example, Joshua never mentioned his was charged with crime unlawful detainer on 
Cassie. (HT 538 pg 226 Ln 4-8), Joshua simply lied to this Court when he 
paraphrased his findings on his page 40 (b) to state that Cassie was found guilty of 
custodial interference "for withholding the children from Respondent for three months" 
when the trial court findings actually stated: 
It became very clear through all the evidence that during litigation, Mr Clarke had a difficult time 
making decisions (with his father very heavily involved in all of his actions and all of his 
decision making). Even important health and safety issues regarding his children are areas 
where he would not be able to make a decision in a short period of time, even if it was 
required. In addition, the Respondent testified to a strong belief in right and wrong which he was 
unwilling or unable to compromise. 
This is illustrated by the numerous parent time problems the parties had throughout 
their separation. The best example happened at Christmas of 2009. Where after more 
than a month of not seeing his children (Cassie refused to let the children go with him after 
his demand for the children for all of the month of November). She kept them from him for 
that month, December, and part of January, claiming that if he had the children he would 
not return them). Counsel for both parties worked diligently to arrange some Christmas 
visitation for Joshua, and arrived at a stipulated agreement where he would have New Year's 
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Eve and part of Christmas Day. Josh wanted significantly more time than the negotiated terms 
and showed up at Christmas Eve, which was outside of the terms of the Agreement and he was 
refused parent time. Mr. Clarke's attitude that it had to be his way or not at all was immature, 
ridiculously stubborn, and hurtful to the children. (TR 525 - 524) 
Concerning the October and December parent time problems, Joshua had 
demanded in writing to Cassie that he be allowed to take the children for a continuous 
four weeks in October 2009. Cassie had refused his demands citing to the Utah Code 
concerning extended parent time and the children's young age. 
When Cassie offered to allow the children to be with Joshua for Halloween, he 
said if he got the kids on October 31, he would keep the children till end of November. 
(HT 538 pg 142 Ln 1-16) Upon hearing this threat from Joshua, Cassie left her home 
with the children to avoid any conflict between her and Joshua in front of the children. 
Joshua came to her house, found her not at home, and then called the police 
saying Cassie had interfered with his parent time and demanded she be cited for 
custodial interference, which she was. 
Joshua failed to tell this Court that the prosecution dismissed the charges 
against Cassie as soon as they learned of the court had ordered parent time to follow 
UCA 30-3-35, which listed Halloween as Cassie's holiday in the 2009 odd year. 
Joshua also failed to tell this Court that the trial court confirmed it was Cassie's holiday 
time for Halloween 2009 and Joshua knew it when he called the cops and demanded 
she be charged with custodial interference. (HT 538 pg 306 Ln 2 - 20) 
Joshua's brief repeatedly cites to Cassie's single conviction of custodial 
interference but never mentions his refusal to have any contact with his children 
whatsoever during the Christmas holidays in 2009 because he did not like the terms of 
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the stipulation entered by his counsel concerning the holiday visitation schedule and 
because he did not want to transport the children both ways. (HT 538 pg 263 Ln 1-13) 
Joshua testified that he knew of the stipulation between counsel concerning the 
Christmas parent time, (TR 538 pg 294 Ln 8 - 21), and that he decided he did not 
want to abide the stipulation it because he wanted more time with the children. (HT 
538 pg 237 Ln 15 - pg 238 Ln 4) 
Joshua admits that when he called the police, he knew what the parent time 
stipulation was and that he still refused to promise to bring the children back as 
agreed. (HT 538 pg 294 Ln 8 - 21) In response to Joshua's refusal to agree to return 
the children as had been agreed, Cassie refused to let them leave with Joshua on 
Christmas eve which resulted in her plea in abeyance for custodial interference. (HT 
pg 178 L n 7 - p g 180-Ln 13) 
On another subject, Joshua said he planned as a routine to keep tending the 
children for 10 hours after having only 3 hours of sleep following his overnight work 
shift each night. (TR 538 pg 293 Ln 2 - 25) Joshua also testified that "/ can't do it 
[physical custody] alone" meaning he would have to have surrogate care, were he 
named as the custodial parent. (TR 538 pg 329 Ln 3 - 19) 
The trial court had all of this information before it when it made its custody 
award. 
Concerning the actual findings about custody, the trial court stated: 
With respect to specific findings regarding custody, the Court finds that each of the parties 
love the children; the children have good relationships with each parent; that neither parent 
has shown much respect for Court Orders, unless they believed the Court Order benefited 
them; that there is some concern about Cassie moving a boyfriend into the house; smoking 
in front of the children, which may not be in the best interests of their health and welfare; that 
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the parent most likely to act in the best interests of the children is Cassie with respect to 
medical decisions, health care decisions, and with the ability to be flexible and compromise 
to promote the children's best interest; and that Joshua lacks the ability to compromise, 
make good decisions quickly, and wouldn't act in the children's best interest with respect to 
their health and safety Neither parent is likely to allow the children frequent and continuing 
contact with the other parent, absent Court Orders. Joint legal custody could not possibly 
work with parents who have this much animosity toward each other. The Utah Advisory 
Guidelines shall be part of the divorce Decree. (TR 521 - 520) 
There is no definitive checklist of factors to be used for determining custody 
since such "factors are highly personal and individual, and do not lend themselves to 
the means of generalization employed in other areas of the law...." Moon v. Moon, 790 
P.2d52, 54 (Utah App. 1990). 
It is obvious from the record of this matter that the trial court very carefully 
considered which parent was "most likely to act in the best interests of the child, 
including allowing the child frequent and continuing contact with the noncustodial 
parent as the court finds appropriate." Id. The trial court clearly weighed each factor 
and made a careful determination of each factor it considered applicable before 
making the custody award. 
Joshua asks the Court of Appeals to completely overlook an extensive record 
that is heavily laden with incidents of his self-contradictory testimony and outright 
refusal to cooperate with the court process on several issues. Joshua's claim that the 
custody award should be negated based upon the lack of the trial court to specifically 
identify the primary caretaker when both parents shared this duty and the alleged lack 
of weight given to Cassie's conduct, while completely ignoring his own conduct must 
be denied. 
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Request for Costs and Attorney's Fees Upon Appeal 
"In divorce actions where the trial court has awarded attorney fees and the 
receiving spouse [prevails] on the main issues, we generally award fees on appeal." 
(quoting Elman v. Elman, 2002 UTApp 83,1J 43, 45 P.3d 176), Stonehocker v. 
Stonehocker, 2008 UTApp 11, f[ 11, 176 P.3d 476 (alteration in original) (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted). 
Utah Code Ann. §30-3-3(2) is the controlling statute and states in pertinent part: 
"In any action to enforce an order of custody, parent-time, child support, alimony, or 
division of property in a domestic case, the court may award costs and attorney fees 
upon determining that the party substantially prevailed upon the claim or defense." 
When awarding fees under subsection (2), the court "may disregard the financial need 
of the moving party." Finlayson v. Finlayson, 874 P.2d 843, 850 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); 
see also Lyngle v. Lyngle, 831 P.2d 1027, 1030 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) 
The guiding factor in fee awards under subsection (2) is whether the party 
seeking an award of fees substantially prevailed on the claim. Fee awards under 
subsection (2) serve no equalizing function but allow the moving party to collect fees 
unnecessarily incurred due to the other party's recalcitrance. See Finlayson, 874 P.2d 
843 at 850-51. 
In Tribe v. Tribe, 59 Utah 112, 202 P. 213 (1921), the Utah Supreme Court 
discussed the rationale for awarding attorney fees when one party "refuses to comply 
with the requirements of [an order or] decree" such that the other party "is compelled 
to bring proceedings against" the offending party to ensure compliance with that order. 
Id. at 216. The court explained that the trial court may award reasonable attorney 
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fees to the moving party so that he or she is not forced "to fritter away in costs and 
counsel fees" the amounts received under the order "by bringing repeated actions to 
enforce payment. . . . " Id. 
In this domestic case, Utah Code Ann. §30-3-3(2) provided the authority for the 
trial court to award Cassie the costs and attorney fees she incurred upon determining 
that she substantially prevailed upon her multiple claims of Joshua refusing to obey 
the orders of the Court. 
Cassie's position is the award of fees was properly made by the trial court to 
allow her, as the prevailing party to collect fees needlessly incurred due to Joshua's 
recalcitrance and his dishonest and evasive conduct, giving rise to several 
unnecessary hearings. Further, because Cassie's attorney billed at the $195 hourly 
rate which was well below the usual and customary fee for services of this type in this 
location, Joshua's claim on his page 37 that Cassie should only receive 2 hours worth 
of reimbursement is ludicrous. 
Joshua's challenge to the award of fees for the September 2010 contempt 
finding completely failed to marshal any of the legions of evidence available to the trial 
court concerning his conduct throughout the 18 months immediately preceding the 
award, whereby he fully earned the right to pay his ex-wife's costs and attorney's fees 
incurred in the several contempt hearings other than the divorce trial, for which she did 
not receive any award of her fees. 
This appeal was not well taken for good cause and has directly caused Cassie 
to accumulate significant additional attorney's fees and costs that will equal or exceed 
the fees she was forced to incur in the trial court. 
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Unlike Joshua, Cassie does not have her father paying for the attorney fees 
she has incurred in this action.(HT pg 291) Therefore, Cassie hereby explicitly and 
respectfully requests that she be allowed to recover the attorney's fees incurred on 
appeal in an amount to be determined by the court. 
CONCLUSION 
The appellant's dishonest and evasive actions in court during several court 
hearings, his multiple incidents of contempt, his continuous stalling tactics and now his 
decisively inadequate appellate brief have all combined to cause Cassie Clarke a 
great injustice. 
In responding to Joshua's appeal, Cassie was forced to incur substantial 
additional attorney's fees in addition to those properly awarded to her by the trial court. 
Cassie has prevailed on the issues presented to the trial court and assuming 
with good cause that she will prevail on this appeal, Cassie Clarke asks this Court to 
award her the fees she has incurred herein. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED ON THIS October \t , 2011. 
Gary Buhler 
Attorney for Cassie Clarke, Appellee 
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